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The objective of this study is to implement the principles of Resilience Engineering (RE) for 
the maintenance management of Offshore Wind Turbine (OWT) systems by taking into 
account human and organizational factors. Resilience concepts are integrated into existing 
maintenance management elements and a resilient model is developed and applied to OWT in 
order to manage the maintenance related risks. The four main capabilities proposed by RE, i.e. 
responding, monitoring, anticipating and learning, are linked to a three level resilience system 
in order to prevent or mitigate OWT maintenance failures. The paper presents the applicability 
and effectiveness of RE in preventing accidents/incidents and system failures, and learning 
activities. 
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1. Introduction 
Wind energy plays a crucial role in improving the renewable power sources of a country/region 
and in reducing the greenhouse effect, and maintaining ecological balance. Global installed 
wind capacity was estimated to be around 370 Gigawatt at the end of 2014 (WWEA, 2015).  
Recent regulatory and economic developments in the EU have significantly changed the wind 
energy perspective for the next 15 years. As a result, wind energy has been the fastest and 
strongest growing renewable energy resource of power production in the world. The European 
Wind Energy Association (EWEA) updated the vision of European wind energy industry for 
2030. EWEA expects 320 GW of wind energy capacity to be installed in the EU by 2030 - 254 
GW of onshore wind and 66 GW of offshore wind (EWEA, 2015).   
However, the current cost of offshore wind energy is much more expensive compared to land 
based power alternatives. Wind turbine operation and maintenance (O&M) represent an 
important part of the wind power production cost due to a large number of component failures. 
Indeed, the operation and maintenance costs represent 20% - 25% in the lifetime of a wind 
turbine. Actually, these costs are limited to 10% - 15% when the wind turbine is almost new, 
but they increase to at least 20% - 35% by the end of its lifetime (EWEA, 2009). High reliability 
and the safety of wind turbines and their components is one of the prerequisites for the 
economic exploitation of onshore and offshore wind farms. For offshore wind farms under 
harsh weather conditions, the demand for reliable and safer wind turbines is even more 
important since both maintenance and repair costs are very high. Moreover, O&M costs can be 
expected to increase further when wind farms are placed at deeper water depths (EWEA, 2009). 
Also, the maintenance cost of offshore wind turbines contributes significantly in the cost of a 
kWh. That cost may be lowered by the application of effective reliability and risk based 
maintenance strategies. 
A wind turbine is a complex power generating system consisting of several structural, 
electrical, and mechanical components interacting with environmental, human and 
organizational factors. Its efficiency and availability depends on its reliability, safety levels and 
the compatibility of its components with the factors mentioned above. In order to increase the 
reliability and safety of offshore wind turbines, risk-based maintenance decisions can be 
adopted to reduce OWT failures and hence minimise the total expected life cycle costs. 
However, the modelling of the relationship between maintenance and safety management is 
not an easy task, especially when human factors play an important role during the maintenance 
phases of offshore wind turbines. 
Research gaps exist in identifying and developing the most suitable risk analysis and safety 
assessment model for Risk Based Maintenance and Operation of Offshore Wind Turbine 
systems. Furthermore, emerging gaps can be encountered when information varies, conditions 
change, or new kinds of events occur during operations in marine and offshore domain. Most 
traditional risk assessment approaches are inefficient in terms of coping with risks in complex 
socio-technological systems. These techniques have some limitations when incorporating a 
new link among risk models, human and organizational factors in order to study modern 
complex technological systems. Therefore, there is a need for a consistent model to be used for 
optimal Risk Based Maintenance, which takes into account human and organizational factors 
for OWT safety management.  
The aim of this paper is to adapt and implement Resilience Engineering (RE) principles to the 
maintenance management of Offshore Wind Turbine (OWT) systems by taking into account 
human and organizational factors. This paper intends to investigate what RE principles and 
techniques exist in literature and how these RE principles can be used in the OWT industry to 
enhance system reliability, availability and safety whilst minimising the costs. A review of 
human factors in incidents/accidents as well as the classification of human factors is carried 
out. Resilience Engineering principles are introduced and then typical failures in OWT are 
categorised. An Integrated Resilience Engineering based O&M framework for OWT is 
proposed so as to enhance the reliability of OWT systems by focusing on human and 
organisational factors. 
This paper is divided into six sections. A literature survey about maintenance related accidents, 
human factors and its role on accidents, as well as information about safety barriers are given 
in section 2. The Principals of Resilience Engineering are introduced together with its 
cornerstones in section 3. Section 4 presents the stages of the proposed resilient model. In 
Section 5, the application of Resilience Principles to the Offshore Wind Turbine maintenance 
is outlined. Section 5 also discusses how the resilience of the OWT maintenance management 
can be improved. In Section 6, a summary of this research and concluding remarks are 
presented.   
1. Human Factors and Resilience Management in Wind Turbine Maintenance  
A wind turbine is a power generating system which is driven by the kinetic energy of the wind. 
A typical wind turbine comprises of 8000 different components, which can be categorised 
according to the tasks they are related to (EWEA, 2009). A commercial offshore wind turbine 
consists of a foundation, transition piece, tower, nacelle and blades. All the power production 
units are located in the nacelle in order to protect them from extreme weather conditions. The 
blades, rotor hub, gearbox and brake are part of the system which maintains the physical 
integrity of the wind turbine and controls the rotation speed of the system between safe 
operating parameters (Robinson et al., 2013). 
Humans play an important role during the design, installation, production, maintenance, and 
operation phases of these systems. Human errors are the main cause of accidents and 
component failures. Human errors in maintenance are normally due to incorrect inspection, 
diagnosis, repair or installation of the equipment. Two specific examples of maintenance errors, 
amongst many others, are the incorrect calibration of equipment and the wrong grease 
application at appropriate points of the equipment. 
2.1 Wind Turbine Accidents  
As expected more accidents occur as more turbines are built and the number of recorded 
accidents reflect this. An average of 33 accidents per year are observed between 1998 and 2002, 
81 accidents per year between 2003 and 2007, 144 accidents per year between 2008 and 2012, 
and 167 accidents per year between 2013 and 2017 (Caithness Windfarms Information Forum 
(CWIF), 2018). More detailed information on wind turbine related accidents and incidents can 
be found on CWIF web page (CWIF, 2018). Fig 1 presents the analysis of 2186 accidents 
related to wind turbines (Figure 1). 
 
Data based on US reported claims in 2012, shows that blade damage and gearbox failure 
account for the greatest number of losses of wind turbines – accounting for 41.4% and 35.1% 
of the total claims reported respectively. Damage to generators (10.2%) and transformers 
(5.1%) are ranked third and fourth, while damage to foundations is ranked fifth. Moreover, the 
top two most frequently reported causes of loss of power generation were cited by the initial 
insurance claims as poor maintenance (24.5%) and lightning strikes (23.4%), followed by 
design defects (11.5%), wear and tear (9.3%) and mechanical defect (6.2%) (GCube, 2013). 
Fig 2 shows that gearboxes caused longest downtime per failure (Windstats Reports, 2009). 
Maintenance is particularly vulnerable to errors as maintenance tasks are often complex and 
involving the frequent removal and replacement of a variety of components in a limited time 
frame (Pennie et al., 2007). A non-reporting  culture in some sectors of the industry has tended 
to discourage the reporting of maintenance incidents. Approximately 60% of the maintenance 
personnel surveyed by Hobbs and Williamson (2008), reported that they had corrected an error 
made by another technician without documenting their action. Windtech International reported 
that a survey of 75 wind farm operators in the U.S. in 2008 found that 60% of turbines may be 
behind the required critical maintenance schedule due largely to a shortage of qualified turbine 
technicians (Raftery, 2012). In the wind turbine industry, failures are frequently reported on 
overloading, overheating, bad designs, etc. but the statistics taken from a manufacturing 
company show that 40% of wind turbine failures are due to human factors (Fig 3).  
2.2 Human Factors Analysis and Classification 
An influential classification of the different types of information processing in industrial tasks 
was developed by Rasmussen (1979). This scheme provides a useful framework for identifying 
different types of errors, which are likely to occur in different operational situations. The 
classification system is known as the skill, rule and knowledge based approach. The terms skill, 
rule and knowledge based approach refer to the degree of conscious control exercised by the 
individual over his or her activities.   
Some taxonomies of human error, which have been developed and used in some industries, can 
be found in Human Reliability Assessment literature. A well-used taxonomy was proposed by 
Swain (1982), and Swain and Guttman (1983), who distinguished between the three main 
categories of errors as listed below: 
(1) Errors of omission - Required action is not carried out. 
Entire task omitted; 
Step(s) in task omitted. 
(2) Errors of commission - Required action is performed incorrectly. 
Selection error – Wrong object selected. 
Sequence error – Acts carried out in wrong sequence. 
Timing error – Acts carried out too early or too late. 
Qualitative error – Acts carried out to too great or too little an extent, or in the wrong 
direction. 
(3) Extraneous acts – Wrong or unnecessary acts are performed. This taxonomy is fairly 
general in its descriptions of error and is therefore able to cover most possible types of 
visible error. 
Hollnagel (1990) distinguishes between external and internal error mechanisms by referring to 
them as the genotype (internal) and phenotype (external) of erroneous actions in his taxonomy. 
Rasmussen (1987) and Hollnagel (1998) argue that taxonomies of human error for error 
analysis techniques need to take into account the internal (psychological) causes of errors when 
classifying them. Reason (1990) offered a comprehensive treatise on the nature of human error 
in his book ‘Human Error’ and he examined errors in four main categories: 
Unsafe acts of operators; 
Preconditions for unsafe acts; 
Organisational influences; 
Unsafe supervision. 
Reason’s model, developed for analysing a wide range of organizational and operational 
accidents, is widely used and accepted. This model is generally named as the Swiss Cheese 
Model. Swiss Cheese represents the deficiencies in a system’s defences by holes in slices 
looking like Swiss Cheese. Reason’s model describes interaction between system wide latent 
conditions (e.g. maintenance failures, inadequate training and procedures) and unsafe acts 
carried out by human operators/technicians and their role in accidents. Most people think of 
safety as the absence of accidents and incidents. In this perspective, which is termed Safety-I, 
safety is defined as a state where as few things as possible go wrong. According to Safety-I, 
things go wrong due to technical, human and organisational causes – failures and malfunctions 
(Eurocontrol, 2009). Humans are therefore viewed predominantly as a liability or hazard. 
Safety management should therefore move from ensuring that ‘as few things as possible go 
wrong’ to ensuring that ‘as many things as possible go right’. This perspective is termed Safety-
II and relates to the system’s ability to succeed under varying conditions. According to Safety-
II, the everyday performance variability needed to respond to varying conditions is the reason 
why things go right. Humans are consequently seen as a resource necessary for system 
flexibility and resilience (Eurocontrol, 2009). 
2.3 Barrier Analysis and Modelling for OWT maintenance  
A barrier is employed to control, prevent, or slow down the hazard from reaching the target. 
Barrier analysis is used to identify hazards associated with an accident and the barriers that 
should have been in place to prevent it (Sklet, 2004). Reason’s Swiss cheese model depicts 
how accidents occur in spite of the use of safety barriers. As in Swiss cheese, there are holes 
representing the weak spots of safety barriers and the likelihood of failure. In order to 
strengthen the barriers, it is important to know where and how big the holes are. This highlights 
the importance of the integrity of safety barriers.  
Different barriers have been widely utilised in several industries for many decades and some 
would even say that they have been utilised forever. Hollnagel (2004) proposes a classification 
based on the nature of the barriers using four categories: material/physical, functional, 
symbolic and regulatory barriers. Material/physical barriers physically prevent an event from 
taking place, functional barriers perform an active function (e.g. equipment alignment), 
symbolic barriers require interpretation (e.g. procedures, signs, instructions) and regulatory 
barriers are not physically present (e.g. checks, rules, safety principles). Favaro and Saleh 
(2017) expressed the “defence-in-depth” as a fundamental safety principle for the design and 
operation of nuclear power plants. In its bare essence, “defence-in-depth” consists in the design 
and implementation of multiple safety barriers. They proposed in their work a safety principle 
termed “observability-in-depth” to prevent some hazard-concealing potential of “defence-in-
depth” from materializing.   
 
Furthermore, barriers are classified as physical and non-physical (ISO 17776, 2000), hard and 
soft defences (Reason, 1998), and technical or human factors-organisational systems (Svenson, 
1991). A recommended way to classify barrier systems is given by Trbojevic (2008). The 
classification includes technical barrier (e.g. emergency shut-down valve, early warning 
system, etc.), human/organisational barrier (e.g. inspection, monitoring, controlling 
instruments operator control, supervision, etc.) and fundamental barrier (e.g. design review, 
commissioning review, procedural review, operational review, competence assurance, good 
health of workforce, etc.). Also, the Aramis project defines safety barriers broadly, so that they 
include not only physical barriers, control instrumentation and active safety barriers, but also 
human actions which implement the whole or parts of the safety functions (Hourtolou and 
Salvi, 2003).  
 
2. Resilience Engineering (RE) 
Resilience is the ability of systems to mount a robust response to unforeseen, unpredicted, and 
unexpected demands and to recover, resume or even continue normal operations. Resilience as 
defined by Woods and Branlat (2011) is a system’s potential for adaptive action in the future 
when information varies, conditions change, or new kinds of events occur, any of which 
challenge the viability of previous adaptations, models, or assumptions. Resilience Engineering 
(RE) is used to represent a new way of thinking about safety. RE is a paradigm which focuses 
on helping people to cope with complexity when they are under pressure to achieve success 
(Woods, 2006). Over the last decade, RE has been proposed as an alternative for the 
management of safety in complex socio-technical systems. RE represents a new ways or 
horizons about safety. Established risk management approaches are based on hindsight and 
emphasise error tabulation and calculation of failure probabilities.  However, RE looks for 
ways to enhance the ability of organisations based on their strengths to create processes that 
are robust yet flexible, to monitor and revise risk models, and to use resources proactively in 
the face of disruptions or ongoing production and economic pressures (Dekker et al., 2014). 
Resilience describes the organisation’s approach in anticipating and circumventing threats to 
its existence and primary goals. According to Hollnagel (2006), a system or an organisation 
must have four abilities in order to be resilient, (See, Fig 4).  
 
RE provides a supplementary perspective on safety assessment and management, and offers 
possible resilience assessment techniques to complement existing procedures or tools. 
Adopting RE does not require that existing practices are discarded completely, nevertheless it 
does mean that existing practices are looked at in a different way, which in turn may change 
how they are applied, as well as the way in which their results are interpreted (Eurocontrol, 
2009). 
The first publications about RE were made in 2003 (Woods, 2003; Woods and Wreathall, 
2003). However, RE became more widely known to the academic society with the first 
Resilience Engineering Symposium in 2004, and also due to the publication of a book based 
on that meeting (Hollnagel and Rigaud, 2006). Many academics have attempted to use and 
develop RE and its principles for modelling systems to make them resilient to shocks or 
disasters. Two significant literature surveys are presented by Righi et al. (2015) and Bergström 
et al. (2015).  Righi et al. (2015) proposed a research agenda for RE and identified six research 
areas: theory of RE; identification and classification of resilience; safety management tools; 
analysis of accidents; risk assessment; and training. Bergström et al. (2015) examined how the 
peer-reviewed safety science literature (a) formulates the rationale behind the study of 
resilience; (b) constructs resilience as a scientific object; and (c) constructs and locates the 
resilient subject. 
Woods (2006) and Jackson and Ferris (2013) have identified four attributes of a system that 
the RE principles seek to achieve as follows:  
Capacity: The ability of the system to survive a threat. 
Flexibility: The ability of the system to adapt to a threat. 
Tolerance: The ability of the system to degrade gracefully in the face of a threat. 
Cohesion: The ability of the system to act as a unified whole in the face of a threat. 
In order to clarify the resilience concept in systems, Wears and Morrison (2013) proposed 
resilient behaviours in three levels: 1) simple, homeostatic response; 2) second order response 
involving more novel adaptations; and 3) a third order response characterized by learning. The 
simplest level is a simple homeostatic response and it can be labelled as Level 0 resilience, 
because they would not consider it resilience at all in the RE community.  After all, it uses the 
numeral 1 to signify that resilience at the second stage is essentially a first order response to 
some disturbances and is labelled as Level 1 resilience. Level 2 resilience is a second order 
response to a disturbance that is either untried, or not well-managed by first order processes. 
Level 2 involves more than just responding, but also engages the activities of anticipation and 
monitoring, since a second level response is often aimed at preparing for the recurrence of a 
similar threat or opportunity.  In level 3, the system has gone through enough second order 
experiences with appropriate and relevant feedback (March, Sproull and Tamuz, 1991), and it 
may then begin to learn how to do second order response well. This not only increases the 
effectiveness of second order responses, but also contributes to building margin (Stephens, 
2010). 
3. Proposed Resilient Management System Model for OWT 
By taking into account underlying causes of human and organizational factors, a systematic 
multi-stage model is developed to implement Resilience Engineering (RE) principles to risk 
based maintenance of OWT (Figure 5). The model contributes to efficient risk management of 
Offshore Wind Turbine (OWT) systems and the key steps of the proposed model are given as 
follows: 
Stage 1: Modelling and planning of the OWT maintenance system: In this stage, problem is 
defined, goals and objectives are identified and data related maintenance failures are gathered.  
Stage 2: Determine and analyse main direct causes and underlying causes of OWT 
maintenance failures, taking into account human and organizational factors: At this stage, 
main direct causes and underlying causes of maintenance related failures are defined.  
Stage 3: Specify technical, human/operational and fundamental safety barriers: At this stage, 
multiple and independent safety barriers are employed to control risks, and to prevent or 
mitigate the consequences of unexpected events occurring in OWT maintenance activities. 
Stage 4:  Identify resilience components and risk management system key factors (HAZID): 
The cornerstones of RE are underlined and significant failures are defined. The abilities or 
qualifications of the resilience components are presented at this stage.  
Stage 5: Allocate levels of resilience for the safety management system: First order, second 
order and third order resilience systems are designated at this stage. First order resilience is 
defined as Level 1 and not considered as part of resilience. Second order and third order 
resilience (Level 2 and Level 3) are the most important and therefore are corner stones of the 
resilience.  
Stage 6: Make inferences and decisions, identify uncertainties, outcomes and continual 
development: This stage gives properties of a truly resilient maintenance management system 
that the system absorbs, adapts, adjusts and survives at all three resilience levels. It also 
responds to how the resilience of the OWT maintenance management can be improved, while 
highlighting the limitations of the proposed resilient model.  
4. Offshore Wind Turbine Maintenance Management 
The Offshore Wind industry has been continuously installing new and bigger offshore turbines, 
which are increasingly further away from the shore.  However, the experience of the Wind 
Energy Industry with offshore wind is very limited and recent, since most of the companies 
have extensive experience only with land based wind turbine operations.  Offshore wind 
companies, which have been trying to reduce the cost of electricity production from offshore 
wind turbines, started to realise that installing offshore wind turbines and performing O&M 
activities on offshore wind turbines are very challenging and significantly different than O&M 
activities on land based wind turbines.  Accessibility difficulties for technicians due to the 
weather conditions, technical limitations of Crew Transfer Vessels (CTV) and limited weather 
windows due to transit time and availability of daylight not only increase the cost of O&M but 
also reduce the electricity production due to the longer unavailability of offshore wind turbines.  
Furthermore, due to the current O&M contract types, offshore wind farm operators have limited 
access to O&M and failure data. It becomes more challenging to develop O&M strategy for 
offshore wind farm operators without in-depth analysis of the data.  Despite all these 
challenges, offshore wind farm operators need to develop a more resilient O&M strategy to 
enhance the reliability of the systems, the quality of the maintenance, and the accessibility, 
while increasing the electricity production as part of reducing the cost of electricity production.  
In this study, RE principles are designated for OWT maintenance in order to prevent or mitigate 
failures and improve safety management of an OWT system. For that purpose, a systematic 
multi-stage model is developed and applied to risk based maintenance of OWT by taking into 
account underlying causes of human and organizational factors. The stages of the proposed 
method are performed step-by-step as follows: 
Stage 1: Maintenance is essential for the OWT industry. It involves a complex organizational 
structure in which each maintenance technician performs varied and challenging tasks with 
limited time, minimal feedback, and sometimes under difficult environmental and weather 
conditions that making accessibility to the offshore wind turbines very difficult and in some 
cases impossible for technicians. Human factors influence wide range of maintenance 
activities, and they affect everything technicians do on the job, from communicating effectively 
with the maintenance team to ensuring that they have adequate equipment to work accurately 
and efficiently as well as the quality of the maintenance performed.  
The main objective of the study is to help the OWT industry to better identify their major 
operational and maintenance weaknesses and constraints in order to improve risk management 
and maintenance operations under the condition of limited time.  
When human factors are in the centre of OWT maintenance safety, quality, capacity, attitude, 
insight and training of personnel are seen as important factors. The organizational culture, 
organizational climate, managerial model, decision-making pattern, and safety culture will also 
affect the outcome. Accidents are usually linked to organizational or managerial issues which 
include a series of errors and are sometimes difficult for frontline personnel to recognize or 
control.  
Stage 2: The paper focuses on significant organizational and human risk factors during OWT 
maintenance, causes of accidents/incidents or failures, which affect complete loss of offshore 
wind turbine energy conversion capability. Therefore, some types of accidents (e.g. human 
loss, injury etc.) are omitted in the current study.  
In the OWT maintenance operations, human factors can be considered under four main 
categories as (Reason, 1990): unsafe acts of offshore maintenance technicians, preconditions 
for unsafe acts, organisational influences and unsafe supervision. Unsafe acts of offshore 
maintenance technicians are taken into account as skill based errors, violations, judgment and 
decision making errors, and perceptual errors.  Preconditions for unsafe acts are considered as 
conditions of technicians and maintenance personnel factors. Organisational influences include 
resource management and organisational processes. Unsafe supervision includes inadequate 
supervision and supervisory violations.  
OWT companies’ reports, PhD dissertations, OWT technicians’ manuals, accident 
investigation reports and journal papers in literature were intensively analysed. Furthermore, 
experts and maintenance managers from offshore renewable companies were consulted 
through a number of workshops, in terms of O&M related issues that they have been 
experiencing with OWT (Dalgic, 2015, Dalgic et al, 2015a, Dalgic et al, 2015b). As a result, the 
potential main results of an OWT hazard, and the main direct causes and underlying causes of 
maintenance related gearbox failures were compiled into a number of lists. The potential main 
results of OWT hazards are listed in Table 1 and the main direct causes are in Table 2. Also, 
the potential causes of organizational risk factors were given in Table 3.  
The maintenance element of the O&M of plants is a combination of all technical, administrative 
and managerial actions and involves routine and non-routine observation, service and repair. 
There is more than one type of maintenance such as preventive maintenance, corrective 
maintenance, condition-based maintenance etc. in Offshore Wind Industry. Preventive 
maintenance is carried out before failures occur in order to avoid or mitigate the consequences 
of potential failures of OWT equipment.  
 
Some of the underlying causes are examined for gearbox failure of OWT as a test case in this 
study (Table 4). Maintenance activities themselves may trigger events which can lead to major 
accidents. As presented in Table 4, skill-based errors are the most common mistakes, which 
are followed by judgment and decision making errors, routine, supervisory, organizational 
process violations or influences, oversights and lastly adverse mental state errors. These aspects 
should be taken into account when planning or conducting risk management related to OWT 
Gearbox component.   
Stage 3: Operation and Maintenance (O&M) plants are intended to support the lifetime 
operation of wind farms to minimise any disruption to energy generation and maximise output. 
The operations side of the O&M facility involves monitoring the performance of the wind farm, 
and organising maintenance schedules. Maintenance of equipment must be considered, not 
only during the production part of its service life but also throughout its technical life. 
Preventive maintenance is carried out before failures occur in order to avoid or mitigate the 
consequences of potential failures of OWT equipment. The different types of preventive 
maintenance and routine periodic tasks and inspections for wind turbines are given in Table 5.  
Deficiencies with preventive maintenance, routine periodic tasks and inspections can lead to 
failures. Deficiencies include inadequate mechanical integrity programs, delayed or deferred 
preventive maintenance, ageing infrastructure of equipment, lack of oversight and training, as 
well as inadequate policies and procedures at Offshore Wind Turbine Farms.  In order to 
prevent or mitigate underlying causes of failures and to improve safety, technical, 
human/organizational and fundamental barriers can be used for OWT maintenance (Table 6). 
Human and organizational barriers, which directly affect the performance of other barrier 
systems, have a significant impact on the risk management of OWT maintenance.  
When linking a barrier to safety critical tasks, one should ensure that the barrier is operational 
at all times and someone is responsible for the task.  Care should be taken to distribute the 
responsibilities so that persons, who maintain, inspect, and control can be certain of the 
reliability and availability of the barriers.  
Multiple and independent safety barriers can be employed to control risks, and to prevent or 
mitigate the consequences of unexpected events occurring during maintenance activities; but 
this may fail due to barrier deficiencies or inherent challenges. Therefore, it is necessary to 
analyse maintenance activities in detail and pay attention to potential latent errors and problems 
related to organizational and human factors. This may enhance risk management capabilities 
and the effectiveness of the barriers. To realize this aim, RE techniques and its principles can 
be assigned to OWT maintenance, and the cornerstones of RE principles can be utilised as 
effective barrier systems to improve OWT reliability and safety.   
Stage 4: RE techniques are important tools to increase resilience characteristics for OWT 
maintenance. In this step, the cornerstones of RE are underlined and significant failures are 
defined. The potential failures of the OWT gearbox system are given as twenty-seven 
underlying causes in Table 4. Resilience components are identified as responding (knowing 
what to do), monitoring (knowing what to look for), anticipating (knowing what to expect) and 
learning (knowing what has happened). The abilities or qualifications of the resilience 
components are presented in Table 7.  
The associations of the underlying causes of gearbox failures and resilience characteristics are 
presented in Tables 8-11. By using resilience characteristics and these associations, OWT 
companies are able to prevent, mitigate or resolve undesired failures or conditions, e.g. as a 
responding characteristic of RE principles, “use golden rules” can prevent some undesirable 
conditions such as “unauthorized repairs/modifications”, or “workaround of regulations or 
standard maintenance procedure by the technician”. Also, “use golden rules” helps to recover 
from “loss of situational awareness by the technician”, “Inadequate technical information of 
the technician about gearbox” or “time pressure”.   
  
Stage 5: First, second and third order (or level) resilience responses of the risk management 
system are designated and depicted in Figure 5. First order resilience is defined as Level 1 in 
OWT maintenance management. Resilience at this level is essentially a first order response for 
some disturbances and is sometimes not considered as part of resilience. Second order 
resilience involves not only responding, but also engages with the activities of anticipation and 
monitoring as a second order response (Level 2). At this level, it is often aimed at preparing 
for the recurrence of a similar threat/failure or opportunity for OWT maintenance. At the third 
level, the OWT maintenance management model begins to learn second order response 
experiences with appropriate and relevant feedback. At Level 3, adaptive capacity is built as 
an “adaptation of future requirements” component for safety management system to materialize 
sustained adaptability. At this level, the system’s overall ability to respond is improved and 
built on the system’s margin. 
Levels of uncertainty or expected resilience magnitude can be used to obtain a resilient success 
model in the current study. The levels are given as follows: 
First order resilience (level 1) or low resilience – High uncertainty; 
Second order resilience (level 2) or medium resilience – Medium uncertainty; 
Third order resilience (level 3) or high resilience – Low uncertainty. 
Stage 6: Specify uncertainties and outcomes. 
The three resilience levels tend to emphasize the cornerstones of resilience activities (Level 1, 
responding; Level 2, monitoring and anticipating; and Level 3, learning), but the clear 
separation of the resilience levels is impossible due to their indeterminate boundaries in real-
world applications. At all three resilience levels, technicians or teams work through 
maintenance operational processes to produce the required result or output, and the 
maintenance team/company incorporates, organises, and supports the operations which 
produce the outputs which carry out the organisations’ safety missions. A truly resilient 
maintenance management system should absorb, adapt, adjust and survive at all three resilience 
levels. To acquire satisfactory resilience performance, an OWT organization needs to 
experience appropriate and relevant feedback at each resilience level. Also, the organization 
must critically focus on RE principles and applications to understand how to build or improve 
adaptive capacity of the company and how to control the mechanism for the future resilience 
expectations.  
 
5.1 How the resilience of the OWT maintenance management can be improved? 
In Tables 8-11, the underlying causes of maintenance related gearbox failures are related to the 
resilience components, which are identified as responding, monitoring, anticipating and 
learning.  For each underlying cause, it was evaluated whether the resilience components can 
contribute to removing or mitigating the effects of the cause.  
The relation between the use of resilience components and total number of causes is presented 
in Figure 6. Effective use of resilience elements contributes to eliminating or mitigating the 
effects of causes. When the Figure 6 is examined, "stop and think" tops the most effective 
resilience component as it removed or mitigated twenty causes. “Use Standard Operation 
Procedures” and “Adaptation to Future Requirements” are the other most important resilience 
elements to improve safety. The least effective resilience elements are seen as “Flexibility”, 
“Having Redundancies in Place” and “Multidisciplinary (Seeing maintenance from different 
perspectives)”. The organization can strengthen safety attitudes, knowledge, and skills by 
taking into account the effects of resilience principles.  
Based on the analysis concrete suggestions are provided together potential improvements as 
follows: 
Resilience as responding: 
With regards to the maintenance of OWT gearbox unit, risk based maintenance operations can 
pursue improvements in reducing or eliminating human errors by using responding elements 
as described in the following:  
(1) Flexibility: It is the ability of the organization to adapt to new or complex problems in 
a way, which maximizes its ability to solve the problems without disrupting overall 
functionality (Wreathall, 2006). 
(2) Knowing the safety margins: The primary implication of underlying causes of gearbox 
failures is to account for uncertainties and risks, which can be significantly increased 
due to eroded or neglected safety margins without management realizing it. Safety 
margins refer to the limits and sequence of disassembly during the maintenance of 
gearbox components. In order to reduce uncertainties and increase safety, maintenance 
operations need to be built with adequate safety margins for technicians. This assures a 
high degree of safe maintenance operation with managed risk. 
(3) Consult with others and think together: Thinking together as a team is the capacity to 
collectively solve problems, develop consistent solutions to encountered problems and 
overcome OWT maintenance challenges. Consulting with others helps to develop the 
understanding of issues, which exceed the understanding of individuals. Team work 
creates both new knowledge and a point of view relevant to a particular context for 
maintenance team members.  
(4) Use golden rules:  The term ‘golden rule’ is used as a proactive and positive quality in 
maintenance processes. Human errors can be reduced or eliminated successfully if the 
following golden rules are applied: (a) Be aware of your capacity and do not carry out 
maintenance tasks if you do not know how to do it (b) Be aware that there is no time 
pressure from the management during the maintenance operation. Do not work if time 
is over.  
(5) Time available: Time pressure may directly constrain the cognitive skills of technicians 
related to creativity in the OWT work environment. Having time can be helpful for 
them to make powerful decisions under high uncertainty and complexity of 
maintenance processes.  
(6) Mitigation of Cognitive biases: Mitigation of cognitive biases is the prevention and 
reduction of the negative effects of cognitive biases. Here are two cognitive biases as 
follows: (a) Technicians can have overconfidence and their subjective confidence in 
their judgments has greater effect than the objective accuracy of those judgments (b) 
They have an urge to finish and reach the goal right away. Overconfidence can be 
attenuated by requiring subjects to consider reasons that they may be wrong (Angner, 
2006).   
5.1.2 Resilience as monitoring: 
Dealing with the OWT gearbox unit in risk based maintenance operations, one can pursue 
improvements in reducing or eliminating human errors by using monitoring elements in the 
following way:  
(1) Checklist: Checklists could increase awareness, improve the process, and promote 
consistency of care. Checklists can allow structured error-capture observations using 
maintenance task descriptions coupled with specific practices, regulations and more 
general elements of safety culture and teamwork. 
(2) Stop and think: Stop and think is for technicians, who will be about to start the 
maintenance operations. It allows technicians to make a plan on how to execute the 
complex maintenance operations consistently and without fault. Risk-awareness is 
enacted through collective or organisational practices rather than through trying to 
change the mindsets of individual workers (Hopkins, 2005). Risk-awareness is 
encouraged among the workforce, through training and learning programs, which 
require technicians to stop and think about risk before commencing work. There is also 
a need for cross-checking of important decisions to increase risk awareness and 
resilience in the event of failures. Cross-checking with other members of the team may 
reduce the chance of maintenance related errors occurring. Moreover, an understanding 
of the increased likelihood of human error in difficult maintenance circumstances might 
raise the awareness of the team, and heighten their vigilance by using the monitoring 
element. 
(3) Multidisciplinary: Technicians must possess multidisciplinary skills in order to 
materialize safer and more resilient maintenance operations. Seeing different 
maintenance perspectives will help technicians feel more confident, enable them to be 
more understanding, and improve communication and relationships.    
(4) Mitigation of cognitive biases: Here are two cognitive biases as follows: (a) Routine is 
a threat due to repeated actions during maintenance operations. (b) There is a danger of 
having a narrowed attention span. Effective techniques can be utilized to improve a 
technician’s ability to stay focused and alert. A person may restore the ability to stay 
focused and alert by taking a rest, doing a different kind of activity, changing mental 
focus, or deliberately choosing to re-focus on the first maintenance operation. 
5.1.3 Resilience as anticipating: 
Dealing with the OWT gearbox unit in risk based maintenance operations, one can pursue 
improvements in reducing or eliminating human errors by using anticipating elements as 
provided in the following:  
(1) Preparedness: Preparedness is an important resilience element in achieving goals and 
in avoiding and mitigating negative outcomes in the OWT maintenance operations. The 
OWT organization actively anticipates problems and prepares for them.  
(2) Vigilance to risks: Being vigilant against potential risks and losses in maintenance 
operations aims to fulfil the requirements to prevent potential threats. A resilient system 
must be both prepared, and be prepared to be unprepared (Paries, 2011). Effective 
training programs to develop a constant state of vigilance to risks can be given to the 
employees. This training improves vigilance performance of technicians that wish to 
combat maintenance related hazards. Technicians taking this training is expected to 
become more aware of maintenance related risks. 
(3) Avoid making assumptions: Employees are able to manage their condition and perform 
their duties to a high standard in maintenance process, avoiding making assumptions or 
guessing regarding the nature of failures. Making assumptions affects their ability to do 
their job adversely in the resilient framework. Each employee will need to be managed 
on a case-by-case basis depending on the nature of their duties. There is a need to be 
developed employees’ skills, such as communication, conversation, questioning and 
teamwork, according to the needs of the task. 
(4) Awareness and scenario thinking: Self-awareness helps technicians build resilience so 
they are able to bounce back from any setback in maintenance progress. The more you 
can foresee the things that are going to happen, the more you can prevent or prepare for 
the risks (Bellamy, 2015). Training for scenario and strategic planning techniques can 
be provided to increase awareness and scenario thinking of technicians. Technicians 
with distinctive options never run out of solutions.  They consider worst case scenarios, 
take into account risks, and potential ways out during the maintenance operations.  
(5) Getting little things right: Getting some little things right can make safer and resilient 
maintenance operations. The simple but essential things are given as follows: (a) Make 
sure you have all the right tools, equipment, technical information and maintenance 
guides. (b) Focus on the details of given tasks. A strong demand for safe work practices 
including control, reporting and transparency of the work by senior leadership can mean 
safer and resilient operations. 
(6) Not to focus individually: This element brings people together to share intelligence, 
knowledge and help one another to reduce the risks. To do so, there is a need to avoid 
a number of stand-alone programs such as lockout, behaviour-based safety, confined 
space entry, job safety analysis etc. All elements of maintenance safety programs can 
be integrated into a single management system that is owned by line management to 
increase individual effectiveness and organizational capacity in the safety area. 
(7) Mindfulness to minor potential problems: The minor or smallest potential things or 
problems can be important issues if maintenance technicians do not pay attention.  It is 
one of the most important safety nets. It can be used mindfulness strategies to avoid 
critical thinking tasks. Also, technicians can prefer to disconnect from their challenges 
and retreat into a meditative mindset instead of rationally thinking through a career 
challenge or dilemma. 
(8) Use systematic analysis: Maintenance operation should be carried out by the 
technicians in a systematic way in accordance with a planned and structured procedure. 
They should use standard operating procedures and checklists, which are prepared by 
the experts and frontline technicians, to reduce risks. They schedule their duties and log 
of control for recommendations and report the obtained maintenance activities.   
5.1.4 Resilience as learning: 
Dealing with the OWT gearbox unit in risk based maintenance operations, one can pursue 
improvements in reducing or eliminating human errors by using learning elements in the 
following:  
(1) Use captured useful feedbacks: Tight feedback loops between team members allow 
them to recover or mitigate failures. Having a continuous feedback loop provides an 
effective early detection system for technicians. Changes in employee behaviour and 
the associated risks are identified quickly, enabling remedial action to be taken.     
(2) Having redundancies in place: The operational safety and availability of the OWT plant 
can be improved by having redundancies for OWT. Redundancies are significant 
contributors to the plant’s sustainable energy productiveness.  
(3) Learning culture: A learning culture is a collection of organizational values, practices 
and processes. These cultural values encourage employees and organizations to develop 
knowledge and competence. Employees are encouraged to ask questions, share 
successes and lessons learned, and propagate and fertilize ideas in a learning culture. A 
learning culture in an organization increases efficiency, productivity and employee 
satisfaction. 
(4) Adaptation to future requirements: The organization and technicians should be capable 
of adaptation to future requirements. They identify technical, human and organizational 
risks early in the maintenance operation cycle while they still have time to do something 
about them.  
(5) Use standard operating procedures (SOPs): An important aspect of resilient 
maintenance operations is to work according to unambiguous, fit for purpose, Standard 
Operating Procedures (SOPs). The whole maintenance process should be described by 
a continuous series of SOPs. SOP is a document, which describes the regularly repeated 
steps and relevant to the quality of the maintenance operation. The purpose of a SOP is 
to carry out the operations correctly and always in the same and resilient manner. A 
SOP should be available at the place where the OWT gearbox maintenance work is 
carried out. The procedures are used for operating instruments, apparatus and other 
equipment, and carrying out safety precautions. SOPs are highly efficient only if all the 
steps are executed without skipping any of the steps or performing workaround.  In 
order to enhance the successes of SOPs, checklists are effective approach to 
compliment SOPs.  
(6) Effective education, training with simulation studies and exercises: With the OWT 
gearbox system maintenance the human has a critical role in ensuring the safety of the 
operations. Human decisions can only be understood in the context in which they are 
taken. Competency in every role is essential to sustain reliable and safe maintenance 
operations. With effective education and training applications, the OWT organization 
empowers individuals and devolves responsibility, recognising experience and 
expertise. Training is relevant and provides the right knowledge and skills for the 
maintenance personnel. 
(7) Do not confuse luck and success: There is a danger of being attracted to success. 
Sometimes success is just luck and not a result of being resilient (RSC, 2015).  
 
 
5.2 Limitations of the Proposed Resilient Maintenance Management Model 
Many of the resilient elements presented and applied here could be viewed as good risk 
management practice to mitigate failures across all OWT maintenance operations, and not 
limited to the use of the narrow context of safety-critical operations. Creating resilience in 
safety critical maintenance operations may create additional costs for companies as it will 
generate higher reliability by encouraging redundancy, experience, learning, effective training 
and increased quality of maintenance. However, this will be easily compensated by producing 
more electricity due to the increased availability.  
Additionally, as organizations still lack the validation process, high resilient maintenance 
management and definition of high reliability characteristics and resilient features of Offshore 
Wind Farms have to be linked objectively to improve organizational or safety performance. 
Organisations must improve how they learn from experience and collaborate with others to 
address the risks in maintenance operations and create a safety culture by questioning and 
challenging in the organisation.  
6 Conclusion 
In this study, one of the challenges is to move the cornerstones of RE from the research domain 
into OWT maintenance and operation. RE principles can be seen as an important factor for 
OWT risk management to handle the situations related to the human/organizational factors 
where strict adherence to emergency maintenance procedures would not guarantee successful 
risk management. Therefore, the ability to learn, anticipate, monitor and respond to emergency 
procedures of the OWT maintenance was considered as an important resilience mechanism. 
The integration of RE principles by considering human factors, organizational procedures and 
processes of OWT management increases reliability and adaptability of OWT maintenance. 
The overall contribution of the paper is to raise awareness of RE and its principles, and to bring 
RE and its principles into the offshore wind domain to recover, prevent or mitigate 
incidents/accidents. This will also contribute to all organizations, companies or personnel 
involved in OWT maintenance operations in order to integrate or be equipped with resilient 
systems or tools in their work environment.  
Complexity of the Offshore Wind Turbines operations requires to assure the safe operation and 
maintenance of these systems. National Offshore Wind Energy Authorities must consider to 
develop a safety program and this program supports the continued evolution of a proactive 
strategy to improve safety performance which is also linked to availability to produce more 
electricity. The foundation of this proactive safety strategy is based on the implementation of 
a Safety Management System (SMS) that systematically addresses safety risks. An approved 
training organization exposing to safety risks related to maintenance operations may control 
the implementation of SMS. The organization strengthen safety attitudes, knowledge, and skills 
of OWT technicians by taking into account RE principles. This should reduce greatly safety 
risks, maintenance and human error costs. 
Resilience has been an important and popular concept over the last few years. However, in 
order to increase its application in engineering issues, there is a need to incorporate the RE’s 
promising feature of sustained adaptability to a dynamic environment. The future work of this 
study will focus on the demonstration of its sustained adaptability to address OWT maintenance 
and operational safety.  
Acknowledgements 
This work was carried out during the corresponding author’s academic visit to the University 
of Strathclyde. The authors would like to thank staff members of the Naval Architecture and 
Marine Engineering Department at the University of Strathclyde for their help and support. 
The authors gratefully acknowledge the Scientific and Technological Research Council of 
Turkey (TUBITAK) for the financial support of the International Postdoctoral Research 
Scholarship Programme, 2219. 
  
References 
Allenby, B., Fink, J., 2005. Toward inherently secure and resilient societies. Science, 309 
(5737), 1034–1036. 
Angner, E., 2006. Economists as experts: Overconfidence in theory and practice. Journal of 
Economic Methodology, 13 (1), 1-24. 
ATSB, 2001. Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB) Survey of Licensed Aircraft 
Maintenance Engineers in Australia. Department of Transport and Regional Service, Canberra, 
Australia. 
Bellamy, L.J., 2015. Bowtie resilience project: Success in the face of uncertainty. Bowtie 
Methodology for Risk Assessment & Management in Aviation, Aloft Aviation Consulting & 
Irish Aviation Authority, Dublin. 
Bergström, J., Van Winsenb, R., Henriqsonc, E., 2015. On the rationale of resilience in the 
domain of safety: A literature review. Reliability Engineering & System Safety, 141, 131-141. 
CWIF, 2018. Wind Turbine Accident Data. Caithness Windfarm Information Forum (CWIF). 
Available from: http://www.caithnesswindfarms.co.uk/AccidentStatistics.htm (Accessed 9 
February 2018). 
Dalgic, Y., 2015, ‘Development of Offshore Wind Operational Expenditure Model and 
Investigation of Optimum Operation and Maintenance Fleet’, PhD thesis, University of 
Strathclyde 
Dalgic, Y., Lazakis, I. & Turan, O., 2015a. Investigation of Optimum Crew Transfer Vessel 
Fleet for Offshore Wind Farm Maintenance Operations. Wind Engineering, 39, 31-52. 
Dalgic, Y., Lazakis, I., Turan, O. & Judah, S., 2015b. Investigation of Optimum Jack-up Vessel 
Chartering Strategy for Offshore Wind Farm O&M Activities. Ocean Engineering, 95, 106-
115. 
Dekker, S., 2014. The field Guide to Understanding ‘Human Error’. Third Edition, CRC Press, 
Taylor&Francis Group, London.  
Emanuelsson, H.-E., 2011. Basic maintenance techniques for wind energy technicians. Heetech 
Consulting, AB.  
Eurocontrol, 2009. A white paper on resilience engineering for ATM, cooperative network 
design. European Organisation for the Safety of Air Navigation (EUROCONTROL), 1-14.  
EWEA, 2009. The economics of wind energy. European Offshore Energy Association 
(EWEA), Brussels. 
EWEA, 2015. The European offshore wind industry - key trends and statistics 1st half 2015. 
European Offshore Energy Association (EWEA), Brussels. 
Fairbanks, R.J., Wears, R.L., Woods. D.D., Hollnagel, E., Plsek, P.E., Cook, R.I., 2014. 
Resilience and resilience engineering in healthcare. Joint Commission Journal on Quality and 
Patient Safety, 40 (8), 376–383. 
Favaro, F.M., Saleh, J.H., 2014. Observability-in-Depth: An Essential Complement to the 
Defense-in-Depth Safety Strategy in The Nuclear Industry. Nuclear Engineering and 
Technology,  46(6), 803-816. 
GCube, 2013. Top 5 US Wind Energy Insurance Claims Report. Available from: 
http://www.gcube-insurance.com/en/top-5-wind-energy-claims (Accessed 6 April 2015). 
Hobbs, A., Williamson, A., 2002. Unsafe acts and unsafe outcomes in aircraft maintenance. 
Ergonomics, 45, 866–882. 
Hollnagel, E., 1990. The Phenotype of Erroneous Actions: Implications for HCI Design. In 
Weir, G. & Alty, J. (Eds) Human - Computer Interaction and Complex Systems. London 
Academic Press. 
Hollnagel, E., 1998. Cognitive Reliability and Error Analysis Method (CREAM). New York: 
Elsevier Science Inc. 
Hollnagel, 2004. Barriers and Accident Prevention. Ashgate Publishing, Hampshire, UK. 
Hollnagel, E., 2006. Resilience - the challenge of the unstable. In E. Hollnagel, D. Woods, & 
N. Leveson (Eds.). Resilience engineering: Concepts and precepts. Aldershot, UK: Ashgate 
Publishing. 
Hollnagel, J., 2011. Resilience Engineering in Practice: A Guidebook. Hollnagel, J. Paries, 
D., Woods, D., Wreathall, J. (Eds.), 193–198, Aldershot, UK: Ashgate. 
Hollnagel, E., Rigaud, E. (Eds.), 2006. Proceedings of the second Resilience Engineering 
Symposium, Juan-les-Pins, France. 
Homeland Security, National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP), Washington, DC, 2009 
Homeland Security, 2013. Partnering for Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience. NIPP, 
USA.  
Hopkins, A., 2005. Safety, culture and risk. Sydney: CCH Australia. 
Hourtolou, D., Salvi, O, 2003. ARAMIS Project: Development of an Integrated Accidental 
Risk Assessment Methodology for Industries in the Framework of SEVESO II Directive, 
Bedford, T. and Gelder, P.H.A.J.M. van. Safety and Reliability ESREL 2003, 829-836.  
ISO 17776, 2000. Petroleum and natural gas industries - Offshore production installations -
Guidelines on tools and techniques for hazard identification and risk assessment. BS EN ISO.  
Jackson, S., 2010. Architecting Resilient Systems, Accident Avoidance and Survival and 
Recovery from Disruptions. New Jersey: John Wiley and Sons, Inc. 
Jackson, S., Ferris, T., 2013. Resilience principles for engineered systems. Systems 
Engineering, 16(2), 152–164. 
Miao, X., Banister, D., 2012. Coping with Natural Disasters through Resilience.  School of 
Management, Harbin Institute of Technology, Transport Studies Unit, University of Oxford. 
Working Paper No: 1059. 
Moench, M., 2009. Adapting to climate change and the risks associated with other natural 
hazards: methods for moving from concepts to action. Earthscan Reader on Adaptation to 
Climate Change, 249-280, Earthscan, London. 
Paries, D., 2011. Resilience Engineering in Practice: A Guidebook. Hollnagel, J. Paries, D., 
Woods, D., Wreathall, J. (Eds.), 193–198, Aldershot, UK: Ashgate 
Pennie, D.J., Brook-Carter, N., Gibson, W.H., 2007. Human factors guidance for maintenance. 
The Royal Institution of Naval Architects, Human Factors in Ship Design. In: Safety and 
Operation Conference, London, UK, March. 
PPD-21, 2013. White House National Security Strategy report, White House, USA.  
Raftery, M., 2012. the dark side of “green”: wind turbine accidents, injuries and fatalities raise 
serious safety concerns. Available from: http://www.eastcountymagazine.org/dark-side-
%E2%80%9Cgreen%E2%80%9D-wind-turbine-accidents-injuries-and-fatalities-raise-
serious-safety-concerns (Accessed 14 May 2015).  
Rasmussen, J., 1979. Notes on Human Error Analysis and Prediction. In Synthesis and 
Ana1ysis Methods for Safety and Reliability Studies, ed. G. Apostolakis and G. Volta. Plenum 
Press. London. 
Rasmussen, J,, 1987. The Definition of Human Error and a Taxonomy for Technical Change. 
In Rasmussen, J., Duncan, K. & Leplat, J. (eds.) New Technology and Human Error. London, 
Wiley. 
Reason, J., 1990. Human Error. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. 
Reason, J., 1998. Achieving a safe culture: Theory and practice. Work & Stress: An 
International Journal of Work, Health & Organisations, 12(3). 
Resilience Engineering Association, 2015. Available from: http://www.resilience-engineering-
association.org (Accessed 26 February 2015). 
Righi, A.W.,  Saurin, T.A.,  Wachs, P. 2015. A systematic literature review of resilience 
engineering: Research areas and a research agenda proposal. Reliability Engineering & System 
Safety, 141, 142-152. 
Robinson, C.M.E., Paramasivam, E.S., Taylor, E.A., Morrison, A.J.T., Sanderson, E.D., 2013. Study and 
development of a methodology for the estimation of the risk and harm to persons from wind 
turbines. HSE Books, Crown copyright, UK.  
RSC, 2015. Success in the face of Uncertainty: Human Resilience and the accident Risk 
Bowtie. Resilience Engineering Consortium, Rev 12, Final Report. 
Sklet, S., 2004. Comparison of some selected methods for accident investigation. Journal of 
Hazardous Materials, 111, 29–37. 
Svenson, O., 1991. The accident evolution and barrier function (AEB) model applied to 
incident analysis in the processing industries. Risk Analysis, 11, 499–507. 
Swain, A.D., 1982. Modelling of human performance in complex systems with emphasis on 
nuclear power plant operations and probabilistic risk assessment. Ergonomics, 25(6), 449. 
Swain, A.D., Guttmann, H.E., 1983. Handbook on Human Reliability Analysis with Emphasis 
on Nuclear Power Plant Applications. NUREG/CR1278, USNRC. 
Trbojevic, V.M., 2008. Optimising Hazard Management by Workforce Engagement and 
Supervision. Prepared by Risk Support Limited for the Health and Safety Executive, RR637, 
HSE Research Report, London. 
Wears, R.L., Morrison, J.B., 2013. Levels of Resilience: Moving from Resilience to Resilience 
Engineering. Proceedings of the 5th International Symposium on Resilience Engineering (in 
review), Utrecht, the Netherlands.  
Windstats Reports, Vols. 19, 22, and 25, Q1 – Q4 in 2006, 2009, and 2012. 
Woods, D. D., 2006. Essential characteristics of resilience. In E. Hollnagel, D. D. Woods, & 
N. Leveson (Eds.), Resilience engineering: Concepts and precepts, 21–34, Aldershot, UK: 
Ashgate. 
Woods, D.D., 2003. Creating foresight: how resilience engineering can transform NASA’s 
approach to risky decision making. Testimony on the future of NASA for committee on 
commerce, science and transportation. 
Woods, D.D., Branlat, M., 2011. Basic patterns in how adaptive systems fail. Resilience 
Engineering in Practice: A Guidebook. Hollnagel, J. Paries, D., Woods, D., Wreathall, J. (Eds.), 
127–143, Aldershot, UK: Ashgate. 
Woods, D., Wreathall, J., 2003. Managing risk proactively: the emergence of resilience 
engineering. Institute for Ergonomics: The Ohio State University. 
Wreathall, J., 2006. Properties of resilient organizations: an initial view. In E. Hollnagel, D. D. 
Woods, & N. Leveson (Eds.), Resilience engineering: Concepts and precepts, 275–285, 
Aldershot, UK: Ashgate. 
WWEA, 2015. WWEA. New Record in Worldwide Wind Installations. Quarterly Bulletin: 
Wind Energy around the World, Issue 1. 
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Table 1 Potential Main Results of an Offshore Wind Turbine Hazard 
No. Results 
1 Blade Failure 
2 Rotor (Hub) Failure 
3 Bearing and Shaft Failure 
4 Main Shaft Gearbox Coupling Failure 
5 Gearbox Failure 
6 Generator Failure 
7 Tower and Foundation Failure 
8 Power Electronics and Electric Controls Failure 
9 Yaw and Pitch Control Failure 
10 Meteorological Measurement System Failure 
11 Grid Connection Failure 
 
  
Table 2 Main Direct Causes of Maintenance Related Gearbox Failures 
No. Cause of Failure 
1 Shaft gearbox coupling failure 
2 Gearbox generator coupling failure 
3 Thermal instability 
4 Torsional and lateral vibrations 
5 Unexpected load 
6 Lubrication failure 
7 Foreign object in gearbox 
8 Misalignments 
9 Manufacturing error 
10 Material degradation 
11 Erosion induced failure 
14 Fatigue 
15 Gear eccentricity 
16 Corrosion induced failure 
17 External factors (weather) 
18 Human error 
 
  
Table 3 Main Causes of Organizational Risk Factors for OWT Maintenance and Operation 
No. Cause of Failure 
1 Ineffective and Deficient Maintenance Management Program 
2 Inadequate Risk Inventory and Management  
3 Disability to Generate Meaningful Management Reports 
4 Insufficient Identification of Reliability Problems 
5 Incapable of evaluation of Maintenance Effectiveness 
6 Inadequacy to Rapid Access to Maintenance History 
7 Inadequacy of Well Trained Maintenance Staff 
8 Inadequate Current Technical Manuals and Documentation 
9 Deficiencies about Building up Maintenance and Test Procedures 
10 Undetermined Maintenance Requirements 
1 Undetermined Skill Level Personnel Requirements 
12 Unplanned Operation and Maintenance Training Requirements  
13 Unplanned Operation and Maintenance Staff Requirements 
14 General Obligations of Employees 
15 Information & Knowledge Deficiencies 
16 Inadequate Audit & Review  
17 Insufficient Monitoring 
18 Incapable of Workload Management 
19 Inactive Coordination & Communication 
20 Disability to Manage Uncertainties 
21 Insufficient Organizational & Safety Culture 
 
  
Table 4 Underlying Causes of Maintenance Related Gearbox Failure 
No. Cause of Failure Failure Type 
1 Excessive/lower/wrong lubrication or greasing Skill-based error / Judgment and 
decision making error 
2 Inadequate technical information of the technician 
about gearbox 
Skill-based error/ Judgment and 
decision making error / 
Organizational influences 
3 Improper cleaning during maintenance Adverse mental state / Violation 
4 Incorrect installation Skill-based error / Judgment and 
decision making error 
5 Ignoring alignment check suggestions (e.g. 
excessive backlash of teeth) 
Skill-based error / Judgment and 
decision making error 
6 Forgetting open panels,  loose components, 
unfixed covers (e.g. bolts) 
Routine violation 
7 Gearbox bearing calibration failure Adverse mental state 
8 Unauthorized repairs/modifications Judgment and decision making 
error 
9 Improper torque application during fitting of 
couplings, gearbox components, etc. 
Skill-based error / Judgment and 
decision making error 
10 Operating beyond lubricant life Judgment and decision making 
error / Violation 
11 Careless use of measurement devices Skill-based error 
12 Leave foreign object in gearbox (e.g. debris) Adverse mental state 
13 Omitted checklist item Skill-based error / Violation 
14 Improper inspection Skill-based error / Judgment and 
decision making error 
15 Use of defected parts Routine violation 
16 Inadequate organizational guidance Oversight 
17 Poor decision by the technician Skill-based error / Judgment and 
decision making error 
18 Loss of situational awareness by the technician Judgment and decision making 
error / Adverse mental states 
19 Procedural mistakes by the technician Judgment and decision making 
error 
20 Bending of regulations or standard maintenance 
procedure by the technician 
Routine violation 
21 Organizational failure to enforce regulations Oversight 
22 Organizational failure to track technician’s 
performance 
Oversight 
23 Poor planning of organization Oversight 
24 Supervisory failure to inspect work done or other 
technician’s duties 
Supervisory violation 
25 Omitting a step or more in the maintenance task 
sequence 
Skill-based error 
26 Use of unauthorized materials/parts or  
unauthorized repairs/modifications 
Routine violation 
27 Time pressure Organizational process violation 
 
  
Table 5 Preventive maintenance and routine periodic tasks and inspections for wind turbines 
No. Type 
1 A check of the gearbox and hydraulic system oil levels. 
2 Inspections for oil leaks. 
3 Inspections on the cables running down the tower and their supporting system. 
4 Observation of the machine while running to check for any unusual drive train 
vibrations. 
5 Inspections of brake disks and brake adjustment. 
6 Inspections of the emergency escape equipment. 
7 Checking the security of fixings, e.g. blade attachment, gearbox hold down, yaw 
bearing attachment. 
8 Checking high speed shaft alignment. 
9 Checking performance of yaw drive and brake. 
10 Bearing greasing. 
11 Oil filter replacement. 
12 Inspecting overspeed protection systems. 
13 Blade cleaning from gradual build-up of dirt. 
 
  
Table 6 Barriers to Prevent Offshore Wind Turbine Gearbox Failures  
Technical barriers 
Construction / commissioning / review 
Operational review (best practice) 
Procedural review 




Monitoring, detection and testing 
Effective training programs 
Increase training – rules and procedures 
Increase training – hazards and risks 
Gantt Chart / Checklists 










Table 7 Characteristics of Principles of Resilience Engineering 
      Responding       Monitoring       Anticipating       Learning 
Flexibility 
Knowing the safety margins 
Consult with others and think 
together 
Use golden rules 
Time available 
Mitigation of cognitive biases 
(Overconfidence, having an urge 
to reach a goal). 
 
Checklist 
Stop and think 
Multidisciplinary (Seeing 
maintenance from different 
perspectives) 
Mitigation of cognitive biases 
(routine, narrowed attention) 
Vigilance to risks 
 
Preparedness 
Vigilance to risks 
Avoid making assumptions 
Awareness and scenario thinking 
Getting little things right 
Not to focus individually 
Mindfulness to minor potential 
problems  
Use systematic analysis 
 
Use captured useful feedback  
Having redundancies in place 
A learning culture 
Adaptation to future requirements 
Use standard operating 
procedures (SOPs) 
Effective education, training with 
simulation studies and exercises 
Do not confuse luck and success 
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      Responding       Monitoring       Anticipating       Learning 
Flexibility 
Knowing the safety margins 
Consult with others and think 
together 
Use golden rules 
Time available 
Mitigation of cognitive biases 
(Overconfidence, having an urge 
to reach a goal). 
 
Checklist 
Stop and think 
Multidisciplinary (Seeing 
maintenance from different 
perspectives) 
Mitigation of cognitive biases 
(routine, narrowed attention) 
Vigilance to risks 
 
Preparedness 
Vigilance to risks 
Avoid making assumptions 
Awareness and scenario thinking 
Getting little things right 
Not to focus individually 
Mindfulness to minor potential 
problems  
Use systematic analysis 
 
Use captured useful feedback  
Having redundancies in place 
A learning culture 
Adaptation to future requirements 
Use standard operating 
procedures (SOPs) 
Effective education, training with 
simulation studies and exercises 




Table 8 Association of Resilience as Responding Component with OWT Risk Based Maintenance Management Systems 
 RESILIENCE AS RESPONDING 
Cause of Failures Flexibility 
Knowing the safety 
margins  
Consult with others 
and think together 
Use golden rules Time available 
Mitigation of cognitive biases 
(overconfidence, having an urge to 
reach the goal) 
Excessive/lower/wrong lubrication or greasing         
Inadequate technical information of the technician about 
gearbox  
       
Improper cleaning during maintenance         
Incorrect installation         
Ignoring alignment check suggestions         
Forgetting open panels,  loose components, unfixed covers 
(e.g. bolts) 
        
Gearbox bearing calibration failure       
Unauthorized repairs/modifications         
Improper torque application during fitting of couplings, 
gearbox components, etc. 
       
Operating beyond lubricant life        
Careless use of measurement devices       
Leave foreign object in gearbox (e.g. debris)        
Omitted checklist item         
Improper inspection        
Use of defected parts        
Inadequate organizational guidance       
Poor decision by the technician        
Loss of situational awareness by the technician         
Procedural mistakes by the technician        
Workaround of regulations or standard maintenance 
procedure by the technician 
          
Organizational failure to enforce regulations        
Organizational failure to track technician’s performance       
Poor planning of organization        
Supervisory failure to inspect work done or other 
technician’s duties 
       
Omitting a step or more in the maintenance task sequence          
Use of unauthorized materials/parts        
Time pressure           
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Table 9 Association of Resilience as Monitoring Component with OWT Risk Based Maintenance Management Systems 
 RESILIENCE AS MONITORING 
Cause of Failures Checklist Stop and think (cross check) 
Multidisciplinary (Seeing maintenance 
from different perspectives) 
Mitigation of cognitive biases 
(routine, narrowed attention) 
Excessive/lower/wrong lubrication or greasing       
Inadequate technical information  of the technician about 
gearbox  
     
Improper cleaning during maintenance       
Incorrect installation        
Ignoring alignment check suggestions        
Forgetting open panels,  loose components, unfixed covers 
(e.g. bolts) 
      
Gearbox bearing calibration failure      
Unauthorized repairs/modifications       
Improper torque application during fitting of couplings, 
gearbox components, etc. 
       
Operating beyond lubricant life       
Careless use of measurement devices       
Leave foreign object in gearbox (e.g. debris)        
Omitted checklist item        
Improper inspection       
Use of defected parts       
Inadequate organizational guidance     
Poor decision by the technician        
Loss of situational awareness by the technician      
Procedural mistakes by the technician       
Bending of regulations or standard maintenance procedure by 
the technician 
       
Organizational failure to enforce regulations     
Organizational failure to track technician’s performance     
Poor planning of organization     
Supervisory failure to inspect work done or other technician’s 
duties 
    
Omitting a step or more in the maintenance task sequence        
Use of unauthorized materials/parts       
Time pressure     
Table 10 Association of Resilience as Anticipating Component with OWT Risk Based Maintenance Management Systems 
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 RESILIENCE AS ANTICIPATING 









Not to focus 
individually  
Mindfulness to minor 




Excessive/lower/wrong lubrication or greasing          
Inadequate technical information of the technician 
about gearbox  
          
Improper cleaning during maintenance          
Incorrect installation           
Ignoring alignment check suggestions               
Forgetting open panels,  loose components, unfixed 
covers (e.g. bolts) 
          
Gearbox bearing calibration failure         
Unauthorized repairs/modifications            
Improper torque application during fitting of couplings, 
gearbox components, etc. 
         
Operating beyond lubricant life            
Careless use of measurement devices         
Leave foreign object in gearbox (e.g. debris)           
Omitted checklist item             
Improper inspection           
Use of defected parts              
Inadequate organizational guidance           
Poor decision by the technician            
Loss of situational awareness by the technician            
Procedural mistakes by the technician            
Bending of regulations or standard maintenance 
procedure by the technician 
            
Organizational failure to enforce regulations          
Organizational failure to track technician’s 
performance 
          
Poor planning of organization           
Supervisory failure to inspect work done or other 
technician’s duties 
          
Omitting a step or more in the maintenance task 
sequence 
          
Use of unauthorized materials/parts             
Time pressure            
 
Table 11 Association of Resilience as Learning Component with OWT Risk Based Maintenance Management Systems 
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 RESILIENCE AS LEARNING 















Effective education,  
training with simulation 




Excessive/lower/wrong lubrication or greasing             
Inadequate technical information of the technician about gearbox             
Improper cleaning during maintenance            
Incorrect installation             
Ignoring alignment check suggestions           
Forgetting open panels,  loose components, unfixed covers (e.g. 
bolts) 
         
Gearbox bearing calibration failure           
Unauthorized repairs/modifications            
Improper torque application during fitting of couplings, gearbox 
components, etc. 
            
Operating beyond lubricant life           
Careless use of measurement devices         
Leave foreign object in gearbox (e.g. debris)         
Omitted checklist item            
Improper inspection            
Use of defected parts            
Inadequate organizational guidance         
Poor decision by the technician            
Loss of situational awareness by the technician        
Procedural mistakes by the technician           
Bending of regulations or standard maintenance procedure by the 
technician 
          
Organizational failure to enforce regulations          
Organizational failure to track technician’s performance         
Poor planning of organization          
Supervisory failure to inspect work done or other technician’s 
duties 
          
Omitting a step or more in the maintenance task sequence            
Use of unauthorized materials/parts            
Time pressure          
 
